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COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 In this diversity case, a jury returned a $1.8 million verdict in favor of Plaintiff 
Buddy’s Plant Plus Corporation (“Buddy’s”) and against Defendant CentiMark 
Corporation (“CentiMark”) on Buddy’s breach of contract and warranty claims.  
Although the Magistrate Judge ultimately upheld the verdict in its favor, Buddy’s appeals 
from the Magistrate Judge’s order granting summary judgment in favor of CentiMark 
with respect to Buddy’s claim of fraudulent inducement.  CentiMark filed a cross-appeal 
of its own.  We will affirm. 
I. 
 This action arose out of CentiMark’s installation of an allegedly defective roof 
coating system—specifically an elastometric acrylic coating—on buildings occupied by 
Buddy’s.  In particular, the buildings were damaged in a hail storm, causing leaks.  
Buddy’s hired CentiMark to apply the coating.  Although the coating was installed, 
Buddy’s reported that the leaks continued.  CentiMark unsuccessfully attempted to fix the 
leaks.  In the process, it installed ungasketed fasteners into the metal roof panels.1  
Buddy’s eventually filed suit against CentiMark.    
 The parties consented to have a Magistrate Judge conduct all proceedings in this 
case.  CentiMark filed a motion for summary judgment.  On January 16, 2013, the 
Magistrate Judge granted this motion as to Buddy’s claims for breach of express 
warranties, breach of implied warranties, breach of the implied warranty of 
                                                 
 
1  A “gasketed” fastener is a screw with a rubber washer, which creates a 
watertight “gasket” around the screw hole when the screw is tightened.  An “ungasketed” 
fastener lacks this rubber washer.            
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merchantability, and fraudulent misrepresentation.  However, the claims for breach of 
contract and breach of the warranty to perform in a workmanlike manner were allowed to 
go forward.  The Magistrate Judge also determined that two contractual provisions were 
enforceable against Buddy’s:  (1) a provision requiring Buddy’s to commence any action 
against CentiMark within one year from the date that a defect or other breach or claim is 
discovered or reasonably should have been discovered; and (2) a provision stating that 
CentiMark shall not be liable for any special, incidental, or consequential damages.  
According to the Magistrate Judge, CentiMark would be entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law on its remaining claims if a jury finds that it was reasonable for Buddy’s to 
discover the breach before November 3, 2008 (i.e., one year prior to the commencement 
of this case).  On October 18, 2013, the Magistrate Judge disposed of the parties’ motions 
in limine, specifically denying CentiMark’s requests to exclude the expert testimony and 
report of Kirby Hartman regarding the estimated cost of replacing the roof panels as well 
as to exclude photographs and videos of the roof.  The parties were also prohibited from 
offering any evidence as to conversations that took place before the contract’s execution 
to explain the meaning of the term “waterproofing material” used in the construction 
specification.   
 A jury trial was then held on the two remaining breach of contract and warranty 
causes of action.  CentiMark moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of 
Buddy’s case in chief and after it completed its own defense.  On December 2, 2013, the 
Magistrate Judge denied both motions.  He also rejected CentiMark’s proposed 
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instruction regarding Buddy’s affirmative duty to investigate the cause of its injury for 
purposes of the contractual one-year limitations period.   
 The jury returned a verdict in favor of Buddy’s and against CentiMark on 
December 2, 2013.  The jury specifically answered “NO” to the first two questions put to 
it:  (1) “Did Buddy’s know or should it have known in the exercise of ‘reasonable 
diligence,’ as that term has been defined to you, that before November 3, 2008, 
CentiMark materially failed to perform one or more of its duties under the contract;” and 
(2) Did Buddy’s know or should have known in the exercise of ‘reasonable diligence,’ as 
that term has been defined to you, that before November 3, 2008, the continued leaking at 
its buildings was the result of CentiMark’s defective material or workmanship.”  (A1663.)  
The jury found that Buddy’s proved by a preponderance of the evidence that:  (3) 
“CentiMark materially failed to perform one or more of its duties under the contract 
which consists of the Construction Specification, the Sales Agreement, and the Non-
Prorated Limited Roof Warranty;” (4) “CentiMark’s material failure to perform one or 
more of its duties under the contract caused Buddy’s to sustain damages;” (5) “the 
materials and/or workmanship provided by CentiMark were defective;” (6) “the defective 
materials and/or workmanship supplied by CentiMark were the direct and proximate 
cause of the roof leaks;” and (7) “CentiMark failed to repair the leaks that were 
proximately caused by defects in CentiMark’s materials and/or workmanship.”  (A1664-
65.)  The jury awarded Buddy’s damages in the amount of $1.8 million.  
 CentiMark moved to mold the verdict to an amount not exceeding the contract 
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price (i.e., approximately $550,000).  On December 3, 2013, the Magistrate Judge denied 
its motion and entered judgment in favor of Buddy’s and against CentiMark in the 
amount of $1.8 million.  CentiMark renewed its prior motions for judgment as a matter of 
law.  It also filed a motion for a new trial as well as a motion for reconsideration of the 
order denying its motion to mold the verdict.  On March 31, 2014, the Magistrate Judge 
denied CentiMark’s post-trial motions. 
II. 
 While Buddy’s merely challenges the Magistrate Judge’s disposition of the 
fraudulent inducement claim, CentiMark raises at least six issues in its cross-appeal.2  In 
the end, we determine that the Magistrate Judge did not commit a reversible error.   
 Buddy’s alleged that “CentiMark made fraudulent representations regarding the 
waterproofing abilities of the elastometric acrylic coating and, in doing so, induced 
Buddy’s to enter into the contract.”  Buddy’s Plant Plus Corp. v. CentiMark Corp., Civil 
Action No. 10-670, 2013 WL 169697, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2013).  It is uncontested 
that the parties executed an integrated written contract.  For instance, the sales agreement 
stated that “[t]he performance of the work contemplated by this Sales Agreement shall be 
governed solely by the terms and conditions stated herein” (A3383), and the warranty 
likewise provided that it “is understood to be the complete and exclusive warranty 
agreement between the Purchaser and CentiMark, superseding all prior agreements, 
                                                 
 2 The Magistrate Judge possessed subject matter jurisdiction over this diversity 
matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.  
§ 1291.  It appears undisputed that Pennsylvania substantive law applies to this matter. 
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whether oral or written, and all other communications between the parties relating to the 
subject matter of this Warranty” (A3386).  “‘Where the parties, without any fraud or 
mistake, have deliberately put their engagements in writing, the law declares the writing 
to be not only the best, but the only, evidence of their agreement.’”  Yocca v. Pittsburgh 
Steelers Sports, Inc., 854 A.2d 425, 436 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Gianni v. Russell & Co., 126 
A. 791, 792 (Pa. 1924)).  Accordingly, “parol evidence may not be admitted based on a 
claim that there was fraud in the inducement of the contract, i.e., that an opposing party 
made false representations that induced the complaining party to agree to the contract” 
(although such evidence may be introduced based on a claim of fraud in the execution the 
contract, i.e., that a term was fraudulently omitted from the contract).  Id. at 437 n.26 
(citing HCB Contractors v. Liberty Place Hotel Assocs., 652 A.2d 1278, 1279 (Pa. 1995); 
Bardwell v. Willis Co., 100 A.2d 102, 104 (Pa. 1953)).  
 According to Buddy’s, its fraudulent inducement cause of action was not barred by 
the integration clause and the parol evidence rule because the prior misrepresentations 
were actually contained in the written contract.  While the Magistrate Judge indicated in 
his summary judgment ruling that Buddy’s should have insisted that the alleged 
waterproofing representations be set forth in the integrated written agreement, he 
subsequently concluded in the in limine opinion that the term “waterproofing material” 
included in the construction specification (which became part of the parties’ contract) 
unambiguously referred to a water-tight barrier.  However, these rulings addressed two 
distinct questions.  As the Magistrate Judge explained, “[t]he court granted summary 
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judgment in favor of CentiMark on the basis of the parol evidence rule as it applied in the 
context of a fraudulent inducement claim.”  Buddy’s Plant Plus Corp. v. CentiMark 
Corp., 978 F. Supp. 2d 523, 536 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (citing Buddy’s, 2013 WL 169697, at 
*6).  “This reasoning does not apply in the current context because the parties now argue 
whether parol evidence is admissible to define the contract’s terms.”  Id.  In fact, the 
Magistrate Judge ultimately applied the parol evidence rule in both instances, i.e., it 
granted summary judgment in favor of CentiMark as to Buddy’s fraudulent inducement 
claim on the grounds that the parol evidence rule barred evidence of any representations 
made before the execution of the contract, and it then concluded that the rule barred the 
parties from offering any evidence as to conversations that took place before the 
contract’s execution to explain the meaning of the contract itself.  In any event, Buddy’s 
fails to cite to any case expressly holding that the parol evidence rule permits a party to 
pursue a fraudulent inducement cause of action simply because the prior representations 
were included in the written contract.3   
 CentiMark asserts that the jury’s verdict violated a contractual cap on damages and 
disclaimer of consequential damages.  According to the warranty: 
If CentiMark determines that the leaks in the roof are caused by defects in 
                                                 
 3 In its reply brief, Buddy’s cites to a 1953 Pennsylvania Supreme Court opinion as 
well as a 1938 ruling by the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas in support of its 
contention that, “[w]here the false representation made prior to the contract is included in 
the contract, the integration clause cannot bar a fraud in the inducement claim as the 
testimony of the representation made prior to the contract is admissible.”  (Buddy’s Brief 
at 49 (citing Anderton v. Patterson, 96 A.2d 111 (Pa. 1953); Casselberry v. Stair, 34 Pa. 
D. & C. 72 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1939)).  However, neither case addressed a claim of 
fraudulent inducement.    
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the materials or workmanship supplied by CentiMark, Purchaser’s remedies 
and CentiMark’s liability shall be limited to CentiMark’s repair of the roof.  
The value of CentiMark’s services performed under this Warranty shall not 
exceed the original cost of the roofing services to the Purchaser. 
 
(A3386.)  Under the plain language of the warranty, the limitation only applies if 
CentiMark itself “determines that the leaks in the roof are caused by defects in the 
materials or workmanship supplied by CentiMark.”  CentiMark, however, has denied that 
its materials or workmanship caused the leaks.  The warranty likewise provided that “in 
no case shall CentiMark be liable for, any special, incidental or consequential damages” 
and that “[s]uch excluded damages include, but are not limited to, . . . the cost of repairing 
and/or replacing other property when the roof services do not perform as warranted.”  
(Id.)  Furthermore, CentiMark is not obligated “to repair the roof system or any part of the 
roof system” in the event of either “[d]amage to the roof because of failure of any 
material used as the base over which the roof is applied (unless provided by CentiMark) 
or damage to the roof because of any material, assemblies or components used in, 
adjacent to or in contact with the roof system which were not furnished by CentiMark” or 
“[d]amage to the roof resulting from tie-ins to other roof systems.”  (Id.)  The damage to 
the existing roof panels caused by CentiMark’s conduct constituted direct damages and 
were not disclaimed by the parties’ contract.  See, e.g., Todd Heller, Inc. v. UPS, 754 A2d 
689, 700 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (“Consequential damages are ‘losses that do not flow 
directly and immediately from an injurious act, but that result indirectly from the act.’” 
(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 394 (7th ed.)).  As Buddy’s aptly puts it, “other 
property” would include, for example, “a piece of machinery damaged because of 
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CentiMark defective material or workmanship”—as opposed to the roof itself, i.e., “the 
property to be repaired.”  (Buddy’s Reply Brief at 10-11.)  Likewise, the damages were 
the result of CentiMark’s application of the coating and subsequent installation of 
ungasketed fasteners (and not, for example, because “of failure of any material used as 
the base over which the roof is applied (unless provided by CentiMark)”).  It also appears 
that the coating and fasteners did not constitute “tie-ins” under the contract (e.g., 
temporary water cut-offs).  
 Buddy’s admits that CentiMark disclaimed all implied warranties, including the 
implied warranty of workmanlike performance.  However, the warranty specifically stated 
that “CentiMark will repair any leaks resulting from defects in the materials or 
workmanship in the roof services (services) performed by CentiMark, to the building 
noted above, for the period of time, noted above, from the Warranty Date.”  (A3386.)  
Given this express language, the Magistrate Judge did not commit any reversible error by 
allowing Buddy’s to pursue a cause of action for “a breach by CentiMark of its express 
warranty to repair leaks caused by defective materials or workmanship provided by 
CentiMark.”  (Buddy’s Reply Brief at 14 (citing A1336, A2700-12).)  
 According to CentiMark, “Buddy’s, as a mere tenant of the Building, does not 
have standing to sue CentiMark for damages representing replacement of the entire roof, 
it only has a right to enforce its Warranty rights.”  (CentiMark’s Reply Brief at 6-7.)  
CentiMark argues that, while Buddy’s has standing to bring “claims for warranty repairs 
and failure to perform services,” claims for damages to real property can only be brought 
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by the property owner, i.e., Studer Rental.  (CentiMark’s Brief at 39.)  Ed Studer 
(Buddy’s chief executive officer and Studer Rental’s vice president) explained that, 
“[p]ursuant to an understanding between Studer Rental and Buddy’s, Buddy’s has agreed 
to undertake to repair the buildings if any of them suffers damage from any source.”  
(A951; see also, e.g., A2323 (“Buddy’s has an agreement with Studer Rental to — they 
take care of all the buildings, all the upkeep.”).)  In fact, the written lease explicitly 
permitted Studer Rental to assign or transfer its rights and obligations.  Accordingly, 
Buddy’s maintained insurance on the buildings (and the insurer subsequently paid the 
claim submitted by Buddy’s for the hail damage).  Given the circumstances, we conclude 
that the Magistrate Judge properly disposed of CentiMark’s standing challenge. 
   Under the warranty, “any action by purchaser, to enforce any claims against 
CentiMark, must be commenced within one (1) year from the date that a defect in 
materials or workmanship, or other breach or any other claim is discovered or reasonably 
should have been discovered.”  (A3386 (emphasis omitted).)  The Magistrate Judge 
determined that, “if a jury finds that it was reasonable for Plaintiff to discover the breach 
of contract at a time before November 3, 2008 (one year prior to the action’s 
commencement), the complaint is untimely and Defendant will be entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law.”  Buddy’s, 2013 WL 169697, at *9.  According to CentiMark, Buddy’s 
was on notice of its claims when the roof first leaked in December 2005, and the jury’s 
finding to the contrary was against the substantial weight of the evidence.  It even goes so 
far as to characterize this case as “a classic example of jury nullification.”  (CentiMark’s 
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Brief at 51.)  Nevertheless, we agree with the Magistrate Judge that “there was substantial 
evidence for the jury to determine that Buddy’s filed suit within the applicable limitations 
period.”  Buddy’s, 2014 WL 1317578, at *4.  Despite ongoing leaks and CentiMark’s 
various attempts to fix the problem, CentiMark claimed that it was unable to determine 
the cause of the leaks and has never acknowledged that the leaks were caused by its own 
defective materials or workmanship.  It was not until 2007 that CentiMark’s employees 
drove ungasketed fasteners through the roof panels, which (according to Buddy’s expert 
witnesses) caused so much damage to the panels that they had to be replaced (or, at least, 
required the installation of a “roof hugger system”).  Buddy’s also cooperated with an 
investigation conducted by a roofing consultant retained by CentiMark, who indicated in 
a November 2007 report that the leaks may have been caused by building condensation or 
the movement of the panels.  “Additionally, there was evidence introduced that Buddy’s 
expert Robert [Stanford] only reported to Buddy’s that the leaking was caused by 
CentiMark’s use of defective workmanship and/or materials in July 2009, five months 
before Buddy’s filed suit.”  Id.   
 While CentiMark challenges the Magistrate Judge’s refusal to instruct the jury that 
Buddy’s had an affirmative duty to investigate its claims, we believe that the Magistrate 
Judge properly charged the jury as to the contractual limitations period.  See, e.g., In re 
Merritt Logan, Inc., 901 F.2d 349, 359 (3d Cir. 1990) (“Once the district judge has 
charged the jury, ‘[o]ur function is to determine whether the charge, taken as a whole and 
viewed in the light of the evidence, fairly and adequately submits the issues in the case to 
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the jury.’” (quoting Ayoub v. Spencer, 550 F.2d 164, 167 (3d Cir. 1977))).  The 
Magistrate Judge based his instructions on the language of the warranty itself (which did 
not expressly refer to any duty to conduct an investigation).  For instance, he charged the 
jury that “[t]he phrase, reasonably should have been discovered, imposes a duty upon 
Buddy’s to exercise only reasonable diligence to discover that it has been injured and by 
what cause,” and that, “[u]nder the reasonable diligence test, you must evaluate Buddy’s 
actions to determine whether it exhibited those qualities of attention, knowledge, 
intelligence and judgment which society requires of its members for the protection of 
their own.”  (A2706.) 
 CentiMark argues that the Magistrate Judge “improperly admitted prejudicial, 
inadmissible evidence.”  (CentiMark’s Brief at 19.)  We review evidentiary 
determinations for abuse of discretion.  See, e.g., Forrest v. Beloit Corp., 424 F.3d 344, 
349 (3d Cir. 2005).     
 Hartman, a roofing contractor, opined that it would cost approximately $1.8 
million to replace the roof panels.  According to CentiMark, Hartman’s one-page estimate 
or report failed to meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) 
and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), because it did 
not state, inter alia, the source of the quantities, measurements, and prices quoted in his 
report, the information he relied on in preparing the report, his qualifications, an 
explanation for why the materials he quoted were suitable for use, a list of publications or 
other cases where his testimony was offered (if any), the amount of his compensation, and 
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whether he was making his opinions to a reasonable degree of professional certainty.  
CentiMark nevertheless acknowledges that “the [District] Court is granted leeway in the 
imposition of sanctions” for violations of Rule 26(a)(2)(B) and (C) (CentiMark’s Brief at 
58) and that “the requirements of the Rule are liberally construed by the courts” 
(CentiMark’s Reply Brief at 19).  It also admits that, given his trial testimony, “Mr. 
Hartman might qualify as an expert roof replacement estimator under Daubert.”  
(CentiMark’s Reply Brief at 20 (footnote omitted).)  In fact, Hartman testified that he had 
more than twenty years of experience working as a roofing contractor and that, in order to 
calculate the cost of replacing the roof panels, he visited the site and took measurements.  
CentiMark also deposed Hartman’s after he submitted his report.  Buddy’s then relied on 
the testimony of two other experts (Robert Stanford and Derek Hodgin) to establish that 
the existing roof panels could not simply be repaired.  Under the circumstances, the cost 
of replacing the roof panels constituted an appropriate measure of damages.  See, e.g., 
Buddy’s, 2014 WL 1317578, at *18 (“Generally, ‘[c]ontract damages are ordinarily based 
on the injured party’s expectation interest and are intended to give him the benefit of his 
bargain by awarding him a sum of money that will, to the extent possible, put him in as 
good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed.’” (quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 347 cmt. a (1981))).   
   CentiMark contends that Buddy’s attempted to avoid the provision of its lease 
providing that Studer Rental was responsible for maintaining the roof in good condition 
by eliciting testimony from Studer about “some vague and undefined duty or agreement 
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[on the part of Buddy’s] to repair damages to the Buildings.”  (CentiMark’s Brief at 59 
(footnote omitted) (citing A2323-24).)  According to CentiMark, this testimony directly 
conflicted with the terms of the written lease and should not have been admitted.  In turn, 
Buddy’s purported failure to produce documentary proof of an amendment or assignment 
meant that testimony about the contents of this documentation constituted inadmissible 
hearsay.  However, it appears undisputed that Buddy’s did produce a copy of the 
insurance policy it had obtained for the property (as well as, inter alia, proof that the 
insurer paid the claim Buddy’s submitted for the hail damage).  It is also uncontested that 
a written contract generally may be modified by a subsequent oral agreement.4  See, e.g., 
Knight v. Gulf Refining Co., 166 A. 880, 882 (Pa. 1933); Michael Salove Co. v. Enrico 
Partners, 23 A.3d 1066, 1070 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011).   
 Finally, CentiMark challenges the admission of photographs and videos depicting 
the roof leaks (which were taken more than six years after CentiMark had initially applied 
the coating) on the grounds that such materials were irrelevant under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 401 and, even if relevant, any probative value was substantially outweighed by 
unfair prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403.  Claiming, inter alia, that the 
existence and severity of the leaks were never disputed, CentiMark asserts that “[t]here 
was no point to this evidence except to provoke an emotional reaction and encourage the 
                                                 
 4 In its reply brief, CentiMark contends that Studer’s testimony violated the best 
evidence rule codified at Federal Rule of Evidence 1002.  Because CentiMark raises this 
argument for the first time in its reply brief, we consider the contention to be waived.  
See, e.g., United States v. Cruz, 757 F.3d 372, 387 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 2015 WL 
133477 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2015).  
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jurors to punish CentiMark with an exorbitant verdict.”  (CentiMark’s Reply Brief at 29.)  
However, as the Magistrate Judge pointed out, the roof was still covered by CentiMark’s 
warranty at the time the photographs and videos were taken.  It also appears that this 
evidence helped to highlight the defective (and damaging) nature of both the coating as 
well as the ungasketed fasteners.  We additionally note that the Magistrate Judge 
specifically instructed the jury to “not let bias, sympathy or prejudice influence your 
decision in any way.”  (A2688.)   
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the Magistrate Judge as 
well as the orders entered by the Magistrate Judge on January 16, 2013, October 18, 2013, 
December 2, 2013, December 3, 2013, and March 31, 2014. 
